Book Review of In the Opinion of the Court by Heymann, Laura A.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1997
Book Review of In the Opinion of the Court
Laura A. Heymann
William & Mary Law School, laheym@wm.edu
Copyright c 1997 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Heymann, Laura A., "Book Review of In the Opinion of the Court" (1997). Faculty Publications. 655.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/655
HeinOnline -- 85 Cal. L. Rev. 761 1997
IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT by William Domnarski. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 183. 
$32.50 cloth, $14.95 paper. 
Reviewed by Laura A. Heymann 
The field of "law as literature"' has been well plowed. The 
movement gained force in the mid-1980s, led by James Boyd White,2 
among others, and has attracted many adherents, both among academics 
and in the judiciary. Judge Richard Posner, a member of both groups, 
has written forcefully on the literary qualities of opinions, most often to 
decry the use of law clerks as ghostwriters and the use of footnotes as 
repositories of anything other than bibliographical information.3 More 
recently, the "law as literature" movement has led to a broader explo-
ration of narrative in the law, of how the need to tell stories is at the 
heart of most, if not all, legal endeavors.4 
William Domnarski, an attorney and writer, is no stranger to the 
field, having written of Shakespeare and Billy Budd in the context of the 
"law and literature" movement.5 His latest work, In the Opinion of the 
Court, is his attempt to fill what he perceives to be a void in the 
scholarship: the lack of a "comprehensive study of the opinions that 
judges ... have labored at in interpreting our statutes and our 
Constitution" (p. 1). Opinions, Domnarski writes, "have not been 
analyzed as a literary form, as communications between the court and 
society .... I hope to change that with this book" (p. 2). While 
Domnarski is not the first to consider opinions as a literary genre,6 his 
book is a lively collection of lists and statistics that is free of the jargon 
1. Law as literature has been distinguished from law in literature (both of which constitute the 
field of law and literature); as one writer has described them, "'law in literature' examines the 
possible relevance of literary texts, particularly those which present themselves as telling a legal 
story, as texts appropriate for study by legal scholars .... 'Law as literature,' on the other hand, seeks 
to apply the techniques of literary criticism to legal texts." IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: 
POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 3 (1995). 
2. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EsSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS 
oF THE LAw (1985). White has been called "a founder of law and literature studies." Robert A. 
Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 201, 201 n.l (1990). 
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 140-57 (1996 ed.). 
4. See, e.g., LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul 
Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
5. See William Domnarski, Shakespeare in the Law, 67 CoNN. BAR J. 317 (1993); William 
Domnarski, Law-Literature Criticism: Charting a Desirable Course with Billy Budd, 34 J. LEGAL 
EDuc. 702 (1984). 
6. For example, Robert Ferguson's often-cited work on judicial opinions as a literary genre, 
supra note 2, fails to gamer a mention. 
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that might have bogged down another literary analysis. In the end, 
however, the issues Domnarski raises, while important, are never fully 
explored. As a brief introduction to judicial opinion writing, In the 
Opinion of the Court hits the mark; as a "comprehensive study," the 
book doesn't quite live up to its potential. 
By the end of the book, two themes emerge: the issue of authorial 
control and the question of audience. Authorial control is always a 
concern when an intermediary exists between writer and reader. Usu~ 
ally, this is an editor or publisher; the West Publishing Company fills 
this role for judicial opinions. Domnarski thus focuses initially on the 
issue of publication. In chapter 1, "Reporting and Publishing Judicial 
Decisions," he traces the familiar tale of how a lawyer from 
Philadelphia named Dallas convinced the Supreme Court in the late 
1700s to let him act as the unofficial reporter. Neither he nor his sue~ 
cessor, Cranch, were particularly skilled at the endeavor: the reports were 
published late, incomplete, and filled with errors (pp. 6-7). The quality 
improved ,vhen Wheaton began adding scholarly commentary in 1816, 
but the venture did not become a profitable one until Peters added 
headnotes and sold the volumes containing condensed versions of all 
previous opinions (pp. 7-9). No doubt piqued by Peters's success, 
Wheaton filed suit, claiming that Peters had violated his copyright in 
opinions that he had reported. The Court, in Wheaton v. Peters,' held 
that no copyright existed in its opinions, thus opening the door to com~ 
peting reporters, most notably the West Publishing Company, which is 
responsible for publishing most of the judicial opinions in this country. 
It wasn't until 1922 that the U.S. government assumed publication of 
Supreme Court opinions; Domnarski notes, "The Court now controlled 
its own product and established, after 130 years, its own means of com~ 
munication with the country" (p. 17). This is not the case, however, 
with lower federal courts, most of which have no official reporter and 
thus no one to "break the stranglehold West Publishing has on the ac~ 
tual content of the opinions it publishes by interposing a facilitator act~ 
ing on the court's behalf' (pp. 28-29). 
The risk of alteration, though, slight as it is, seems to me to be a less 
interesting issue than other benefits that might arise from control, which 
go unexplored. How, for example, might the Court use its control over 
publication to better disseminate opinions that are intended to be read 
by the general public? Has West's system of headnotes and the 
prevalence of electronic publication, both of which allow researchers to 
jump directly to the pertinent parts of the opinion, frustrated the literary 
aspirations of judges? And what lessons can be learned from examples 
of control in other literary forms: the editor of a long-dead author's 
7. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
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novel, for example? These are, of course, not the only questions that 
could be explored, but an analysis of the role of publishers in shaping 
judicial opinions seems to require something more than mere history. 
For most appellate opinions, authorial control is further under-
mined by an additional intermediary: the law clerk, who is often given 
the task of drafting opinions. Domnarski highlights the debate, begin-
ning in the 1950s and continuing today, over the influence law clerks 
should have in judicial decision making and the implications of their 
role for analysis of opinions: "[O]ur discussions of who the Justices are 
and what their opinions mean are so falsely premised that they lose in-
tellectual respectability" (p. 41). Because we can't be sure to whom the 
words we read belong, the entire effort to discuss judicial opinions as a 
literary genre is undermined. Without an author around whom to center 
the writing, Domnarski suggests, an analysis of style becomes aimless. 
Nevertheless, chapter 2, "Who Writes Judicial Opinions," and chapter 3, 
"Style and Substance in Supreme Court Opinions," both focus on the 
internal aspects of opinions-language and style-rather than on opin-
ions as literary products. Domnarski is solidly in Judge Posner's camp 
here in decrying the blandness and similarity of many judicial opinions. 
This, he claims, stems from two sources. First, because law clerks write 
many of the opinions coming out of federal courts (pp. 30-31, 38-44), 
and because these clerks are "almost always" recent law review editors 
who have been trained to write in "law reviewese," the opinions are 
usually "colorless, scholarly in the sense of citing many cases as prece-
dent for each and every principle of law, and extensively footnoted" (p. 
57). Second, the necessity of gaining a majority means that opinion 
writers have to appeal to their colleagues, who may have slightly differ-
ent views about how an issue should be decided. Justice Douglas, for 
example, noted that opinions "are sometimes so opaque or irrational 
perhaps, in the sense of not being logical developments structur-
ally ... because of the patchwork that goes into their creation, satisfying 
this judge, getting a majority by putting in a footnote, striking out a 
sentence that would have made a paragraph lucid ... " (p. 34). Free 
from these concerns, the writer of a concurrence or a dissent can be 
more flamboyant and provide "relief from the tedium" (p. 58). The 
difference in control is illustrated in the attributions that precede opin-
ions. The author of the majority opinion, although identified, is always 
delivering the "opinion of the Court," in which the pronoun "we" is 
used; the author of the concurrence or dissent retains the honor indi-
vidually-he or she may be joined by other Justices but is always 
speaking for himself or herself, using "!."8 
8. But see Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES, supra 
note 4, at 188: "[A]ssignment of individual responsibility invites the onlooker to become all too aware 
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The discussion of the stylistic appeal of opinions also highlights the 
issue of audience. Domnarski's most salient point-although it is a 
rather thin thread drawn throughout the book-is that opinions work 
best when they are written with a broad, lay audience in mind (p. 88). 
"The connection between the medium and the message in the Supreme 
Court's work," he writes, "was especially clear in the fifties and sixties. 
Opinions resolving issues of important individual rights tended to be 
shorter than the usual opinion and were more directly aimed at the aver-
age reader" (p. 70). Thus Brown v. Board of Education9 was intention-
ally kept short (fourteen paragraphs) and in simple language, so that the 
general public, most of whom would be affected by the decision, could 
understand it (pp. 70, 82). 10 By contrast, the output of the Court's 
nineteenth-century Justices is less readable, due in part to the fact that 
their opinions "had little dissemination and received even less critical 
commentary to guide them" (p. 62) -in ~hort, they were not part of a 
public dialogue. 
Thus, the delegation of opinion writing to clerks not only dimin-
ishes authorial control but also engenders a distancing between writer 
and audience. In chapters 4 through 6, Domnarski explores examples 
of opinions in which this distance has been shortened. The eleven 
opinions of Domnarski's "canon" in chapter 4 are all Supreme Court 
opinions that establish or augur "an important rule ... affecting a fun-
damental aspect .. . of the American democracy or the American way 
of life ... with clarity, conviction, or eloquence" (p. 77) .11 Chapter 5, 
"Style and Substance in Lower Federal Court Opinions," moves 
quickly through various examples of notable stylists, including Judges 
Hand, Kozinski, and Selya (of whom Domnarski says, "He consistently 
and frequently uses obscure diction, for no other apparent reason than 
to show off' (p. 106)), but pauses at none of these long enough to of-
fer much in the way of analysis. And chapter 6, "Closing the Circle," 
is Domnarski's paean to Posner, an opinion writer who has "close[d] 
of the importance of assignment practices within the Court because of the potentially different styles 
and approaches associated with the particular members of the Court." 
9. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
10. This point is also made by Sanford Levinson, see Levinson, supra note 8, at 198. 
11. Domnarski' s canon includes, in order, McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819); Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Chambers v. Florida, 309 
U.S. 227 (1940); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 
(1952); Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); 
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Domnarski has likely taken his cue from Judge Posner, who 
noted in his landmark work, Law and Literature, that he left to "lawyers, judges, and law professors" 
the task of constructing the "canon of 'leading' cases." RICHARD A. PoSNER, LAW AND 
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 20 (1988). 
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the gap between reader and writer" through various techniques, in-
cluding addressing the reader directly (p. 124)}2 
The relationship between opinion and audience is an important 
consideration, and one that has been addressed by several other writers. 13 
But Domnarski leaves unsaid (at least in the pages of this book) that 
perhaps not every opinion is designed to be read by the general public; 
that, in fact, each opinion has multiple audiences}4 The attempt to ap-
peal to many or all of these audiences simultaneously is in part what 
causes the incoherence of which Domnarski complains. Writing for a 
lay audience's understanding has its appeal, but it may not always be 
appropriate. Strong arguments have been made for positioning the liti-
gants as the primary audience; they are, after all, the ones for whom the 
opinion has immediate meaning and thus deserve a complete and de-
tailed response to their arguments. "By demonstrating to litigants and 
lawyers that they have been heard," Judge Becker has asserted, "written 
opinions reinforce the bar's confidence in the bench and enhance the 
legitimacy of the judicial process in the eyes of the people."15 The liti-
gants in the particular case and their lawyers might be the primary audi-
ence, but there are others, including other courts that might review the 
case, other courts that review similar cases, the legislature that drafted the 
statute at issue, lawyers, academics, and law students. Opinions are 
"communications between the court and society," to be sure, but soci-
ety is multilayered; Domnarski' s book would have benefited greatly 
from a consideration of those layers. 
12. Unfortunately, Domnarski slightly undercuts the evidence for these arguments. He works 
to establish a canon of judicial opinions in chapter 4, laying out six determinative factors and eleven 
qualifying opinions but admits that "not all of the cases of the canon meet all of the criteria I set out 
earlier" (pp. 87-88). (Domnarski attempts to deflect this criticism by attributing it to "readers keen on 
detecting inconsistencies, discrepancies, and ambiguities-lawyers, for example.") In chapter 6, he 
quotes a Posner opinion in full in order to "illustrateD Posner's methodology" only to conclude after 
seven pages that it "is in some ways not the best example of a Posner opinion. He is not as colloquial 
and there is little figurative language here. And as for tone, there is not as much of the whirlwind 
flavor and glee that infects so many of Posner's other opinions ... " (pp. 136-43). 
13. Judge Posner explored this relationship in a 1995 article and reached similar conclusions. 
See Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?). 62 U. CHI. L REV. 1421, 
1429-30 (1995) (contrasting "pure" judicial opinions, written for lawyers, which are long-winded, 
solemn, impersonal, and predictable, with "impure" judicial opinions, written for laypersons, which 
are bold, conversational, fresh, and enjoyable). 
14. As Professor Schauer has noted, the general public might be at the bottom of this list 
"[O]rdinary people simply do not read judicial opinions." Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 
U. CHI. L REV. 1455, 1463 (1995). It is doubtful, although open to debate, whether this would 
change if opinions were written with lay audiences in mind. 
15. Edward R. Becker,/n Praise of Footnotes, 74 WASH U. LQ. I, 3 (1996). See also Patricia 
M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. CHI. L REV. 1451, 1453 (1995) (countering Posner's 
criticism of nonliterary opinions by asserting that litigants are the primary audience for judicial 
opinions). 
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Instead, too much of the book is taken up by statistics and facts that 
make for interesting reading but stray from the book's mission. Much 
of chapter 2, for example, is spent listing the credentials of various sit-
ting judges, including which ones are members of Phi Beta Kappa and 
which were law review editors (a dubious honor, given Domnarski's 
earlier critique). Many pages are spent in chapter 5 collating statistics 
on lower federal court opinions: the number of criminal cases, the vari-
ous statutes challenged, the number of words in published opinions. 
Domnarski's research is impressive, and could serve as the foundation 
for a literary analysis, but it has been underutilized in this book. 
There are, however, some useful thoughts on the process of opinion 
writing to be found in Domnarski' s book. He quotes Justice Holmes, 
who, in a letter to diplomat Lewis Einstein, wrote, "[m]y only serious 
interest when I first got here a week ago was to have my work for the 
term bound up in a little volume as I do each year. Until that is done 
the term is not closed. Then it becomes history and I can hold eight 
months of my life in my hand and look it over" (p. 35). Domnarski 
presents this quotation merely as evidence of Holmes's writing habits, 
but the connection it makes between publication and authority is ripe 
for exploration. Another such thought comes from Justice Jackson, 
who noted, "[u]ntil Cardozo's time, there was a suspicion among law-
yers of any lawyer who wrote too well. It was almost believed that a 
good literary style was evidence of poor legal craftsmanship" (p. 67). 
Anecdotes such as these make for entertaining reading and suggest 
the richness of the material available for analysis. What Domnarski' s 
book seems to be missing, however, is any probing consideration of the 
whole. If judicial opinions are to be seen as a literary form, how does 
that form compare with or borrow from other literary genres? Is the art 
of ghostwriting an independently analyzable style?16 Is Posner's 
"closing the gap" by addressing the reader directly simply a twentieth-
century form of the Victorian novelist's "Dear Reader''? Do legal afi-
cionados await forthcoming Supreme Court opinions much as Dickens 
fans awaited the arrival of the next installment of Bleak House? And 
why do we have literary expectations for judicial opinions and not for 
16. The Nancy Drew series, for example, which carried the author's name of "Carolyn 
Keene," was written by several writers over the years, all conforming to a specific style. See Susan 
Chira,HarrietAdams Dies; Nancy Drew Author Wrote 200Nove/s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1982, at AI, 
B 11. But see Joseph Vining, Law and Enchantment: The Place of Belief, 86 MtCH. L REV. 577, 590 
(1987): "[J]ust as literary critics feel foolish in applying elaborate techniques of literary analysis to 
segments of a book that tum out to have been ghostwritten by an editor, lawyers simply have to have 
difficulty reading ghostwritten texts as if they were authentie." Vining's assertion, of course, leaves 
open the question of what "authentic" means. 
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other government writings, such as agency publications in the Federal 
Register?17 
It is usually not very fruitful to criticize a book simply because it is 
not the book one would have written or searched for on the subject. 
And perhaps Domnarski's book will serve as the basis for a deeper ex-
ploration of the subject; he does, after all, describe the project as " a 
general, comprehensive essay" (p. 2). In the Opinion of the Court 
seems to be written for readers in other disciplines-those literature or 
policy students who want a brief taste of how judicial opinions are writ-
ten. Yet Domnarski concludes by calling for a consideration of judicial 
opinions "without the edges of current critical theory" in order to rec-
ognize opinions as "legal literature that can soar to the level of litera-
ture generally" (p. 155)-in other words, to read opinions much as we 
might read a novel or a particularly well-written magazine article. It's a 
lofty and public-minded goal, and one that might inject a note of 
democratic participation into what has often been seen as an antidemo-
cratic process. But so long as opinions have an instrumental function, 
such as resolving differences between litigants, it's a goal that may never 
be fully realized. 
17. As Professor Schauer has noted: 
It is a routine charge against contemporary judicial opinions that they read more like 
statutes than like opinions of a court .... 
• • • Yet those same commentators typically fail to castigate OSHA regulations as 
uninteresting, do not worry about the lack of literary style in the Internal Revenue Code, 
and are reluctant to complain about the intricate scheme of exceptions, definitions, parts, 
and subparts in the Securities Act of 1933. Schauer, supra note 14, at 1455. 
